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NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 39, 1960

Fraud-Recovery of :the Defrauding Buyer's
Profits on Resale
Fraudulently purporting to act on behalf of a non-profit hospital entitled to purchase medical supplies under a federal subsidy
program for less than their market value, defendant bought medical supplies for $2,000 and immediately resold them for $34,000.
The government sought damages under a federal statute entitling
Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Davis, 127 F.2d 780 (4th Cir.
1942); Lightfoot v. Weiss, 213 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1954).
1s 216 F.2d 609 (9th Cir. 1954).
10 The court has not done so at the time of this writing.
20 American Hardwarde Ins. Co. v. Van Vick, supra note 1; Slllivan,
Long and Haggerty v. Washington, 238 F.2d 241 (7th Cir. 1956).
21 Parker v. Checker Taxi Co., 238 F.2d 241 (7th Cir. 1956); c.f. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Davis, supra note 17.
22 182 F.2d 752 (8th Cir. 1950).
23 Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Feutz, supra note 13, at 759.
11
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it to a flat penalty of $2,0001 plus an additional penalty of twice
the amount "of any damage which the United States may have
sustained by reason" of defendant's fraud. Held: The "damage
. . . sustained" was the different between the $2,000 paid by defendant and the $34,000 resale price. The court made no attempt
to determine either the trial-date market value of the supplies or
their value at the time of their purchase from the government.
The government was "damaged" to the extent of whatever profit
defendant made on the resale and this apparently, even though for
all that appeared defendant may have resold the supplies for more
than their market value. 2
The case is interesting not only for its interpretation of the
federal statute involved3 but for its applicability in any case in
which a defrauding buyer makes a profit by reselling and more
particularly where the defrauded seller is arguably unable to
prove any actual damage. Indeed, the court in deciding the instant case relied heavily on common law principles.
In approaching any fraud damage problem the lawyer thinks
immediately of the traditional fraud damage rules, the "loss-ofbargain" rule under which the defrauded party recovers the difference between the value of the property received and its value
as represented and the so-called "out-of-pocket" rule under which
damages are measured by the difference between the amount
paid and the amount received. 4 The difficulty with these rules
1

2
3

4

The Surplus Property Act § 26 (b}, 58 Stat. 780 (1944) [later reenacted by 63 Stat. 392 (1949), 40 U.S.C. 489 (1958)] provides that
the wrongdoer:
(1) shall pay to the United States the sum of $2,000 for each
act, and double the amount of any damage which the United
States may have sustained by reason thereof, together with the
cost of suit; . . . .
United States v. Bound Brook Hospital, 251 F.2d 12 (3d Cir. 1958).
According to the opinion in the principal case, the government seems
only to have sought the $2,000 fine in previous cases. The principal
case appears to be first in allowing the United States to recover
damages sustained. Apparently the United States failed to prove
damages in the previous cases. For example, in Rex Trailer Co. v.
United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1955) the defendant alleged veteran
priority rights in order to buy certain motor vehicles from the
United States at a discount. Since the defendant's gain was not
shown, the government's recovery was limited to $2,000 for each
overt act.
The "loss-of-bargain" rule is illustrated by the case of Beaver Drug
Co. v. Hatch, 61 Utah 597, 217 P. 695 (1923). A seller represented
certain stocks to be worth $4,000. After the buyer discovered the
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as applied to the instant case, of course, is that they are fashioned
primarily for cases where the buyer rather than the seller has
been defrauded. In addition the seller here is actually out of
pocket nothing and, economically speaking, has the same bargain
with the fraud as without it.
A third possibility, equally as obvious as the traditional measures, would be to fix the loss by the difference between the
amount paid by defendant and the market value of the supplies
either at the time of the transaction or at the time of the trial.
This measure is the one applied when a defrauded seller waives
the buyer's fraud and sues for conversion5 and is the practical
result obtained by a recission action. As noted above, however,
the court did not consider this possibility.
The court instead applied the restitutional measure and fixed
the government's "loss" according to the full benefit of defendant's
gain in the transaction. The court relied heavily on section 151
of the Restatement of Restitution providing for a defrauded seller's
recovery of the buyer's profit. 6 The result seems sensible except
for a case where the defrauding buyer resells for less than market
value. The defrauding seller should in any event be entitled to
the difference between the amount paid by the buyer and actual

stocks to be worth only $2,834.59, the buyer was allowed to recover
$1,165.41. An example of the "out-of-pocket" rule is Mullin v. Gano,
299 Pa. 251, 149 A. 488 (1930). A buyer was induced to invest $6,000
in certain property represented to be very valuable. The court refused to recognize the seller's represented value, and computed damages as the difference between the actual value, $3,187.50, and the
amount paid, $6,000, or $2,812.50.
G See, e.g., Thurston v. Blanchard, 39 Mass. (22 Pick.) 18, 33 Am. Dec.
700 (1839); Richmyer v. Mutual Live Stock Comm'n Co., 122 Neb.
317, 240 N.W. 315 (1932); Yeggy v. Fidelity Co., 118 Neb. 792, 226
N.W. 444 (1929).
a Restatement, Restitution § 151 provides:
Where a person is entitled to a money judgment against
another because by fraud, duress or other consciously tortious
conduct the other has acquired, retained or disposed of his property, the measure of recovery for the benefit received by the
other is the value of the property at the time of its improper
acquisition, retention or disposition, or a higher value if this is
required to avoid injustice where the property has fluctuated in
value or additions have been made to it.
Comment (f) provides the wrongdoer:
. . . is subject to liability at the election of the rightful
owner for the value of anything received in exchange therefor.
He is also liable for profits made by its use.
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market value and, indeed, this qualification is made by the Re-

statement.1
Nebraska appears to have no case even remotely in point but
it is submitted that the instant case is correct and would be followed by our supreme court should the problem arise. Nebraska
fraud damage precedents reveal an extremely broad and flexible
approach designed to meet the equities of the partiular case.8

Duane Hubbard '61

